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I. INTRODUCTION

The provision of health care has traditionally been deemed a
charitable function.' Therefore, hospitals and other health care institutions have been afforded the benefits of tax exemption. 2 As a standard for determining which entities merit the tax exemption and
which do not, the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS" or "Service")

3
developed what has come to be known as the community benefit test.

At the federal level, this test has been the basis for awarding taxexempt status to hospitals and other health care entities4 State
legislatures have traditionally followed the federal government's
standards for tax exemption and have thus allowed health care
5
organizations to be exempt from state taxes as well.
In recent years, the United States health care system has
changed dramatically. These changes have altered the ways in which
health care services are provided. 6 In seeking to find new and innovative organizational models for health care delivery, the health care
industry has been confronted with a major question-namely,
whether these new models of health care delivery should be tax-exempt. Critics of the tax exemption afforded health care organizations
argue that health care has become more of a business and that nonprofit health care entities are no different than their for-profit coun7

terparts.

The debate over non-profit health care organizations has
reached a critical point, as evidenced by the challenges to the tax-

1.

John D. Colombo, Health Care Reform and Federal Tax Exemption: Rethinking the

Issues, 29 Wake Forest L. Rev. 215, 215 (1994).
2.
Id. These entities have sought exemption under I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1994).
3.
Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-2 Cum. Bull. 117.
4.
Id. See also Geisinger Health Plan u. Commissioner, 985 F.2d 1210 (3d Cir. 1993)
(applying the community benefit standard to a health maintenance organization).
5.
Often state statutes have merely provided that entities that are organized for
charitable purposes are exempt from taxation. See, for example, Tenn. Code Ann. § 67-5-212
(1995), which exempts "charitable" institutions from property taxes. Statutes such as these
leave the responsibility with the state courts to define what is charitable. Other statutes
explicitly exempt property used for hopital purposes from taxation. See, for example, 72 Pa.
Stat. § 5453.202(a)(3) (Purdon, 1995).
6.
As this Note will discuss, a concept known as managed competition has led to the
development of new health care affiliations such as integrated delivery systems. Mark A. Hall,
Managed Competition and IntegratedHealth CareDelivery Systems, 29 Wake Forest L. Rev. 1, 4
(1994).
7.
See Robert Charles Clark, Does the Nonprofit Form Fit the Hospital Industry, 93
Harv. L. Rev. 1416, 1417 (1980) (stating that the preference for the non-profit form has deprived
the government of billions of dollars without corresponding efficiency advantages); John D.
Colombo, John Colombo Says Tax The Hospitals, 9 Exempt Org. Tax Rev. 1294, 1295 (June
1994) (arguing for the revocation of the tax exemption for hospitals).
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exempt status of hospitals in many states. 8 It is further evidenced by

the IRS's recent challenge to the tax-exempt status of a health
maintenance organization ("HMO") in Geisinger Health Plan v.
Commissioner.9
This Note will demonstrate that these challenges to tax exemption have essentially involved the issue of what the community
benefit standard should require and what we should expect from our
non-profit health care institutions. This Note will argue that the
community benefit test is premised on two important aspects of nonprofit health care entities, which the courts and the IRS have already
implicitly recognized. First, non-profit health care entities must
organize and govern themselves in a way that allows them to be responsive to the needs of their communities.10 Second, these organizations must produce socially desirable outcomes by providing benefits

8. See Utah County v.IntermountainHealth Care, 709 P.2d 265, 278 (Utah 1985) (revoking
the state property tax exemption for two non-profit hospitals); Texas Tax Code Ann. § 11.18(d)(i)
(Vernon, 1992 & Supp. 1995) (setting forth specific charitable care standards that hospitals
must meet in order to be exempt from state property taxes); School District v. Hamot Medical
Center, 602 A.2d 407, 414 (Pa. 1992) (revoking a hospital's tax-exempt status); Roger Williams
General Hospital v. Littler, 566 A.2d 948, 950 (R.I. 1989) (upholding an assessment of taxes on
equipment leased by tax-exempt hospitals). Compare Douglas County v. Anneewakee, Inc., 346
S.E.2d 368, 371-72 (Ga. App. 1986) (rejecting a county tax board's assessment of property taxes
on a non-profit hospital); Medical Center Hospitalv. City of Burlington,566 A.2d 1352, 1357 (Vt.
1989) (rejecting a city officials' challenge to the tax-exempt status of a non-profit hospital);
Callaway Community Hospital v. Craighead,759 S.W.2d 253, 257 (Mo. App. 1988) (reversing
the assessment of property taxes by county officials and upholding a hospital's tax-exempt
status); Downtown HospitalAssociation v. Board of Equalization, 760 S.W.2d 954, 958 (Tenn.
App. 1988) (reversing the State Board of Equalizations determination that a non-profit hospital
was not exempt from property taxes).
9.
985 F.2d 1210 (3d Cir. 1993). Furthermore, many theorists have questioned whether
a rationale exists for exempting non-profit health care entities from taxation. See, for example,
Henry Hansmann, The Rationalefor Exempting Nonprofit Organizationsfrom CorporateIncome
Taxation, 91 Yale L. J. 54, 55 (1981); Mark A. Hall and John D. Colombo, The CharitableStatus
of Nonprofit Hospitals: Toward a Donative Theory of Tax Exemption, 66 Wash. L. Rev. 307, 313
(1991).
10. In Revenue Ruling 69-545, the IRS stated that a non-profit hospital must be
"organized and operated exclusively in furtherance of some purpose considered 'charitable.'"
1969-2 Cum. Bull. at 117-18 (cited in note 3). The IRS then promulgated the community benefit
test to determine whether a hospital was carrying out these functions. Id. at 118. As this Note
will argue, the IRS should make more explicit the dual rationale for the community benefit
standard and should develop criteria that adequately measure both organization and operation.
See also J. David Seay, Tax-Exemption for Hospitals: Towards an Understandingof Community
Benefit, 7 Exempt Org. Tax Rev. 413, 414 (March 1993) (arguing that the community benefit
standard is premised on expectations about how non-profit hospitals are organized and
governed). Organizational requirements for non-profits are also set forth in the regulations for
I.R.C. § 501(c)(3). See 26 C.F.R. § 1.501(c)(3) (1994). The regulations require that a charitable
organization incorporate under state non-profit statutes, state an exempt purpose, and provide
for the distribution of assets for an exempt purpose upon dissolution. Id.
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to their communities that the government might otherwise have to
provide."
Part II of this Note will analyze the legal framework for tax
exemption that courts have applied to hospitals, discussing the major
inroads on the tax-exempt status of hospitals, particularly at the state
level. Part III will discuss the evolution of the health care industry
into new organizational models and will analyze the tax-exempt
treatment that these entities have received. Finally, Part IV will
suggest that a refined version of the community benefit test provides
the best means for preserving the beneficial characteristics of nonprofit health care entities while not interfering with the taxing purposes of the IRS. This refined community benefit test should be
premised explicitly on both the organizational advantages and the
beneficial outcomes provided by non-profit health care entities.
II. TAx EXEMPTION AND THE HOSPITAL INDUSTRY
A. The Legal Framework
Since the advent of taxation, the law has traditionally accorded
hospitals the benefits of tax exemption.12 Non-profit hospitals have
sought exemption from federal income taxes under Section 501(c)(3) of
the

Internal

Revenue

Code. 13

This

provision

contains

both

11. This notion is explicitly recognized in the requirement that non-profit health care
entities be "operated" in furtherance of a charitable purpose. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) (1994); 1969-2
Cum. Bull. at 117 (cited in note 3). The community benefit test has attempted to define which
entities are operated for "charitable" purposes by requiring such services as an open emergency
room. 1969-2 Cum. Bull. at 118 (cited in note 3). Several courts have also recognized this
function of non-profits. See Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 591 (1983)
("Charitable exemptions are justified on the basis that the exempt entity confers a public
benefit-a benefit which the society or the community may not itself choose or be able to
provide"); Utah County, 709 P.2d at 278 ("[A] charitable organization should be eligible for
exemption because it performs a task which the government would otherwise have to perform").
See also Seay, 7 Exempt Org. Tax Rev. at 414 (cited in note 10) (stating that the community
benefit standard is based on the fact that non-profit health care entities provide socially
desirable benefits to their communities); J. David Seay and Robert M. Sigmond, Community
Benefit Standards for Hospitals: Perceptions and Performance, 5 Frontiers Health Services
Mgmt. 3, 11 (Spring 1989) (stating that one benefit provided by non-profit hospitals is the
provision of services which are highly valued by patients but which are not provided as often by
for-profit entitities because of their low profitability).
12. Colombo, 29 Wake Forest L. Rev. at 215 (cited in note 1).
13. I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) exempts from taxation:
[c]orporations... organized and operated exclusively for religious, charitable,
scientific... or educational purposes .... no part of the net earnings of which inures to
the benefit of any private shareholder or individual, no substantial part of the activities
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organizational and operational requirements to qualify for exempt
status. 4 To fulfill the organizational component, the entity must
qualify as a charitable organization, and so must incorporate under
state non-profit statutes, claim an exempt purpose, and provide for
the distribution of corporate assets for an exempt purpose upon
dissolution. 15 To meet the operational test, the entity must pursue a
charitable purpose and may not engage in private inurement.16 In
addition to exemption from federal income taxes, non-profit hospitals
benefit from the fact that donors to the organization receive a
corresponding deduction from their income taxes. 7
Non-profit
organizations can also issue tax-exempt bonds' 8 and have traditionally
been exempted from state and local income, sales, and property
taxes. 19
The standards the IRS developed for evaluating the tax-exempt status of hospitals have evolved throughout the years. The IRS
originally required hospitals to provide charitable care to the extent of
their financial ability in order to obtain tax-exempt status. 20 To maintain tax-exempt status, hospitals could not deny medical treatment to
those unable to pay. 2' After Medicare and Medicaid were implemented, the need for traditional charity care was reduced22 and the
IRS set forth a new approach to the tax-exempt status of hospitals in
Revenue Ruling 69-545.23
This ruling held that even when a hospital's general admissions policy requires a patient to pay for services, the hospital benefits
the community if it operates for charitable purposes and maintains an
open emergency room. 24 The IRS further deemed the "promotion of
health" to be a benefit to the community. 25 The fact that some members of the community, such as indigents, did not receive benefits did

of which is carrying on propaganda, or otherwise attempting, to influence
legislation... and which does not participate in... any political campaign on behalf of
(or in opposition to) any candidate for public office.
14. 26 C.F.R. § 1.501(c)(3)-1.
15. Id.
16. Id.
17. Seay and Sigmond, 5 Frontiers Health Services Mgmt. at 35 (cited in note 11).

18.

Id.

19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.

Id. at9.
Rev. Rul. 56-185, 1956-1 Cum. Bull. 202, 203.
Id.
Hall and Colombo, 66 Wash. L. Rev. at 320 (cited in note 9).
1969-2 Cum. Bull. at 117 (cited in note 3).
Id. at 118.
Id.
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not automatically disqualify a hospital from meeting the community
benefit standard. 26 The IRS based its ruling partly on the notion that
a hospital should be per se exempt, regardless of whether the patient
pays for services, because the provision of health care is charitable in
itself. The ruling also articulated a broader community benefit theory
of hospital tax exemption, as evidenced by the IRS's focus on such
factors as the hospital's open emergency room, its independent board
of directors, and its open medical staff.27
The IRS continued to expand the class of hospitals that could
receive tax-exempt status with its issuance of Revenue Ruling 83157.28 In this ruling, the IRS stated that a hospital with limited services, no open emergency room, and a policy of treating only paying
patients could qualify for tax exemption.29 This ruling allowed specialty hospitals, such as cancer and eye hospitals, to qualify for taxexempt status provided that other indicia of community benefits were
present. 0
Although the IRS characterized its analysis of a hospital's taxexempt status as a totality of the circumstances inquiry,3 1 its public
pronouncements demonstrated that the Service was focusing on several distinct factors. 32 These factors included whether a hospital
possessed an independent board of directors drawn from the general
community, an open medical staff, nondiscriminatory treatment of
Medicare and Medicaid patients, and an emergency room open to
nonpaying patients. SS The delineation of these factors is the closest
the IRS has come to explicitly defining the term "community benefit."
An analysis of the IRS's factors for granting tax-exempt status
demonstrates that the community benefit test is in fact premised
upon both organizational and outcome criteria.4 The requirement

26. Id.
27. Id.
28. 1983-2 Cum. Bull. 94.
29. Id. at 94-95. This ruling held that an open emergency room was not required for taxexempt status if it would be unnecessary or duplicative with respect to facilities already available. Id.
30. Id. at 95. The IRS stated that the hospital's open medical staff, board of directors
drawn from the community, and treatment of Medicare and Medicaid patients demonstrated the
hospital's benefit to the community. Id.
31. 1969-2 Cum. Bull. at 118 (cited in note 3).
32. Colombo, 29 Wake Forest L. Rev. at 219 n.28 (cited in note 1).
33. Id. In sum, a hospital seeking to qualify for federal tax exemption must be properly
organized under I.R.C. § 501(c)(3) and must meet the community benefit standard. 1969-2 Cum.
Bull. at 117-118 (cited in note 3). A hospital should also operate an open emergency room if it
maintains one. Id.
34. In Revenue Ruling 69-545, the IRS explicitly stated that a non-profit hospital must be
"organized and operated" exclusively for charitable purposes in addition to meeting the other
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that a hospital maintain an independent board of directors drawn
from the general community is an example of an organizational
component of the community benefit test. Requiring that a hospital's
board of directors be made up of members of the local community
ensures that the hospital is organized in such a way that it can be
responsive and accountable to the health care needs of its
community. 35 The open medical staff requirement is also an
organizational component of the community benefit test. This
requirement gives physicians broad access to hospital facilities so that
members of the public can have access to quality physician services at
36
any hospital they choose to attend.
The IRS's community benefit test also contains outcome criteria. The requirement that hospitals provide non-discriminatory
treatment to Medicare and Medicaid patients provides a measurable
benefit to the community. It ensures that individuals who participate
in government-sponsored health care programs receive the same care
as those patients who are privately insured37 Finally, the requirement that non-profit hospitals maintain an open emergency room
benefits the community by serving as a safety net for uninsured persons who would not otherwise have access to health care services. 38
B. Challenges to the Tax-Exempt Status of Hospitals
As the definition of "community benefit" for hospitals has become less dependent on charitable functions traditionally associated
with medical care, people have begun to question the propriety of
granting tax
exemptions to entities that may no longer be
"charitable. ' 39 Critics of tax-exempt status contend that hospitals now
treat mainly paying patients and, as evidenced by Revenue Ruling 83-

requirements of I.R.C. § 501(c)(3). However, the IRS did not analyze the community benefit test
by separately and explicitly delineating which aspects of the hospital furthered the
organizational component and which furthered the operational component as this Note argues
that it should. See 1969-2 Cum.Bull. at 117 (cited in note 3).
35. Colombo, 29 Wake Forest L. Rev. at 242 (cited in note 1).
36. Gerald R. Peters, A PracticalExamination of the IRS and OIG Rules for Integrated
Delivery Systems, 7 Exempt Org. Tax Rev. 765, 767 (May 1993).
37. Colombo, 29 Wake Forest L. Rev. at 218 (cited in note 1).
38. Id. at 243.
39. See, for example, N. Keith Emge, Jr., Nonprofit Hospitals and the State Tax
Exemption: An Analysis of the Issues Since Utah County v. Intermountain Health Care, Inc., 9
Va. Tax Rev. 599, 612 (1990) (noting that non-profit hospitals are being forced to behave more
like for-profit facilities with regard to the patients they treat and the facilities they provide).
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157, need not even maintain an open emergency room.40 This shift in
tax policy has led some states to challenge the tax-exempt status of
their hospitals and to question the community benefit test as a stan41
dard for determining which entities deserve tax-exempt status.
Historically, the states followed the federal government's standards for tax exemption and thus allowed similar exemptions from
state taxes. 42 Although state legislatures, not courts, have the power
to grant tax exemptions, local officials have recently brought challenges to the tax-exempt status of hospitals before state courts.4 3 The
courts have therefore had to interpret state statutory and constitu44
tional provisions granting health care entities tax-exempt status.
The Utah Supreme Court's decision in Utah County v. Intermountain
Health Care45 is representative of the trend toward state courts taking
an activist role in determining the standards for tax exemption.
In Intermountain Health Care, the Utah Supreme Court denied state tax exemption to two non-profit hospitals because they
were not operated for "charitable" purposes according to the court's
interpretation of that term from the Utah Constitution.46 The hospitals were operated by a non-profit corporation, Intermountain Health
Care ("IHC"). 47 They were supervised by an unpaid board of trustees.48 The corporation had no stock, and no dividends were paid to
its trustees.4 9 The hospitals had policies of treating patients without
regard for their ability to pay. 50 Furthermore, one of the hospitals
was the sole provider of specialized tertiary care for a large geographic region. 51
The court determined that non-profit status should not be
based on whether a hospital provides a community benefit because
52
even for-profit hospitals benefit their communities in some respect.
Instead, the majority defined the word "charity" under the Utah

40. 1983-2 Cum. Bull. at 94 (cited in note 28).
41. See note 8.
42. But see Clark, 93 Harv. L. Rev. at 1475 (cited in note 7) (arguing that non-profit hospitals should not be exempted from state property taxes).
43. See note 8.
44. Id. See also note 100 and accompanying text.
45. 709 P.2d 265 (Utah 1985).
46. Id. at 278.
47. Id. at 267.
48. Id.
49. Id.
50. Id. at 274.
51.
Id. at 274 n.14. Tertiary care is the term used for sophisticated and high cost medical
services. See id.
52.
Id. at 276.
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Constitution as a gift to the community.53 According to the court, a
gift to the community could be identified either by a substantial
disparity in the exchange between the charity and the beneficiary of
the services or by a reduction of the government's burden through the
54
charity's operation.
The court's definition of charity stemmed from its finding that
non-profit hospitals are becoming increasingly indistinguishable from
for-profit entities in terms of their charitable functions. 55 The court
sought to ensure that a hospital would not be able to obtain the benefits of tax exemption merely because it was organized in the nonprofit form. 56 The court thus established a multi-factor test for
determining whether a hospital should be tax-exempt. This test considered whether a hospital was organized in a non-profit form and
also examined whether the hospital provided specific outcomes to its
community in the form of measurable community benefits.57
More specifically, the test's organizational component
considered whether the hospital had a stated purpose of providing
services without compensation, whether private inurement was
prevented, and whether the entity was organized so as to subordinate
commercial activities to charitable ones. 58
The test's outcome
component determined whether the hospital provided measurable
benefits that reduced the government's burden. 59 The court focused
on whether the hospital provided free care and whether the group

53. Id. at 269.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 271.
56. See id. at 275 (noting that the only distinction between the non-profit hospitals in this
case and for-profit entities was their corporate form, not their operation).
57. Id. at 269. The court's test looked to:
(1) whether the stated purpose of the entity is to provide a significant service to others
without immediate expectation of material reward; (2) whether the entity is supported,
and to what extent, by donations and gifts; (3) whether the recipients of the "charity" are
required to pay for the assistance received, in whole or in part; (4) whether the income
received from all sources (gifts, donations, and payment from recipients) produces a
"profit" to the entity in the sense that the income exceeds operating and long-term maintenance expenses; (5) whether the beneficiaries of the "charity" are restricted or unrestricted and, if restricted, whether the restriction bears a reasonable relationship to the
entity's charitable objectives; and (6) whether dividends or some other form of financial
benefit, or assets upon dissolution, are available to private interests, and whether the
entity is organized and operated so that any commercial activities are subordinate or
incidental to charitable ones.
Id. at 269-70.
58. Id.

59.

Id.
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eligible to receive such care was restricted. 60 The court's test also
contained two components which were neither organizational nor
outcome-oriented.
These included whether the hospital had
accumulated capital in excess of expenses and whether the hospital
61
was supported by donations.
The two non-profit hospitals in this case had policies in place
requiring them to provide services regardless of ability to pay. 62 They

were also prohibited from using their earnings to benefit private
individuals and from distributing assets to private individuals upon
dissolution.63 Therefore, the hospitals met these aspects of the court's
organizational criteria. 64 The hospitals failed to show, however, that
their commercial enterprises were subordinate to their charitable
65
ones.
Moreover, the Utah Supreme Court found that the hospitals
failed the test's outcome-based criteria. 66 The court focused on the
fact that the vast majority of recipients of the hospital's services paid
for such services. 67 This exchange of services for money did not satisfy
the court's "gift" standard.6s The court also noted several incidents
where the hospitals had failed to treat indigent patients, indicating
that the hospitals did not see themselves as being responsible for
providing charitable care. 69 The court further found that the hospitals
were not supported primarily by donations and gifts, but instead
raised revenue by treating mostly paying patients.70 Finally, the hospitals failed the court's test because they had revenues in excess of
71
their expenses.
The Utah Supreme Court's approach was novel in many respects. First, the court focused on the level of free care provided by
the hospitals.72 The hospitals' acceptance of Medicare and Medicaid

60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.
69.

Id.
Id.
Id. at 274.
Id. at 273.
Id. at 272-73.
Id. at 276.
Id. at 274-78.
Id. at 274.
Id. at 276-77.
Id. at 276.

70. Id. at 273.
71. Id. at 275-76.
72. See id. at 274 (rejecting the hospital's claim that opening their facilities to all persons
regardless of ability to pay was sufficient, and looking to the actual amount of free care given).
But see Medical Center Hospital, 566 A.2d at 1355 (rejecting a contention that a hospital's taxexempt status should be determined by the level of free care provided).

1996]

HEALTH CARE INDUSTRY

patients did not meet the gift standard required by the court. 73 The
court reasoned that the acceptance of Medicare and Medicaid patients
74
merely constituted the provision of services for government money.
Collection of such "remuneration" did not constitute a gift under the
court's defimition. 75
The court also determined that non-profit hospitals should
support themselves by donations rather than by payment for services,
which primarily supports for-profit hospitals. 76 Although the court
did not define the level of donative support it would require, many
non-profit hospitals will probably encounter difficulty meeting this
requirement given the prevalence of third-party payment systems,
such as private insurance, Medicare, and Medicaid. This is because
77
these forms of insurance now provide a majority of hospital revenue.
The Utah Supreme Court confronted yet another important
issue by inquiring as to whether non-profit hospitals produce a
"profit" in the sense that their revenues exceed their operating expenses.7 8 Traditionally, profit-making hospitals have retained nonprofit, tax-exempt status based upon the rationale that by plowing
their revenues back into the entity, these hospitals use their profits to
9
provide tangible community benefits, including improved facilities7
The court rejected this argument because it found that most for-profit
hospitals also utilize excess revenues for expanding their facilities
and for purchasing new technology.80 The court stated that it would

73. IntermountainHealth Care,709 P.2d at 274.
74. Id. at 274.
75. Id.
76. Id. But see Medical Center Hospital, 566 A.2d at 1356 (rejecting such a requirement
because of the difficulty that a modern non-profit hospital would have in meeting it due to the
advent of third-party payment systems).
77. See Hall and Colombo, 66 Wash. L. Rev. at 405-08 (cited in note 9).
78. Intermountain Health Care, 709 P.2d at 269. The dissent argued that the charging of
fees for services, as well as the receipt of revenues in excess of expenses, did not make the nonprofit hospitals "noncharitable." All that is required is that the organization utilize all of its
funds for its charitable purpose. The evidence showed that while the hospital did receive
substantial revenues from patients and through third-party payments, all of these funds were
used to provide hospital services to those in need. Id. at 282-83 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
79. Id. at 275-76. The court did in fact find that IHC's revenues were used for the construction and improvement of its facilities. Id. at 275. For a discussion of the argument that
non-profits are distinguishable based on the fact that their revenues are used for the provision
of improved services, see Hall and Colombo, 66 Wash. L. Rev. at 383-84 (cited in note 9).
80. Intermountain Health Care, 709 P.2d at 275. The dissent argued that the majority
opinion ignored two fundamental differences between for-profit and non-profit hospitals. First,
by definition for-profit hospitals exist to make a profit. Id. at 289 (Stewart, J., dissenting).
Second, the for-profit hospitals' decisions are governed by economics rather than by the altruism
that governs non-profits. Id. at 289-90. Altruism may cause nonprofits to provide more complex
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not require an entity seeking tax-exempt status to consume all of its
assets before being eligible for a tax exemption. 81 However, the court
questioned the propriety of granting a tax exemption that would
essentially function as a competitive advantage for non-profit hospi-

tals when those hospitals could not be effectively distinguished from
82

their for-profit counterparts.
The Utah Supreme Court's opinion raises several legitimate
concerns regarding the exemption of hospitals from taxation. The
court was concerned that non-profit hospitals may now function as
mechanisms for maximizing physician incomes, rather than as
83
mechanisms for providing charitable health care to the community.
Moreover, the court emphasized that both for-profit hospitals and
non-profit hospitals can and do provide charity care.8 Finally, the
court considered whether the tax exemption functions as an unfair
competitive advantage for non-profit hospitals.85
The Utah Supreme Court's opinion implicitly reevaluated the
community benefit standard. The court was skeptical that an entity's
qualifications for tax exemption, or for that matter its provision of
community benefits, could be measured solely by organizational
criteria.86
The court searched for outcome criteria that would
87
measure the benefits that non-profit hospitals actually provide.
The test set forth by the Utah Supreme Court in
Intermountain Health Care, however, does not adequately refine the
community benefit test. Although the court's test contained an
appropriate organizational component,8 8 its outcome criteria are
services, such as trauma care or burn treatment, which would not be profitable for the for-profit
entities to operate. Id. at 290.
81. Id. at 276.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 271-72.
84. Id. at 271 n.10, 275.
85. Id. at 276.
86. See Howell v. County Bd. of Cache County, 881 P.2d 880, 885 n.10 (Utah 1994) (stating
the court's concerns about the Intermountain Health Care case, which had been decided nine
years earlier).
87. Id. In Howell, the court determined that the state tax commission's standards for
determining hospital tax exemption, which were promulgated in response to the test elaborated
in IntermountainHealth Care, were constitutional. Id. at 890. Referring to its previous decision in IntermountainHealth Care,the Howell court stated: "by focusing only on an institution's
organizational and financial framework, one risks missing the more central question of whether
the institution has bestowed a gift on the community." Id. at 885 n.10. In evaluating the state
tax commission's standards, the court also noted that several of the factors were
"organizational," while the others attempted to define and quantify the concept of "gift to the
community." Id. at 886 n.12.
88. The court's emphasis on the hospitals' prevention of private inurement, their subordination of commercial activities to charitable ones, and their stated mission of providing care
regardless of ability to pay effectively determined whether the hospitals were organized in a
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subject to criticism. The court's test examined the amount of charitable care the hospitals provided, but its conception of charitable care
will not necessarily result in the greatest benefit to each hospital's
community. The court should have focused instead on whether the
hospitals were providing the services most needed in their
communities. Under the court's standard, a hospital could satisfy a
charitable care requirement by undertaking a small number of very
costly, medically interesting charitable cases. The court's standard
failed to recognize, however, that a hospital might be able to provide a
greater benefit to its community by spending less money, yet
providing preventive care such as immunizations, physicals, or
prenatal care to a larger number of people.
Furthermore, the court's outcome criteria were not broad
enough to encompass a major benefit provided by one of the non-profit
hospitals in IntermountainHealth Care. One of the hospitals was the
sole provider of certain specialized hospital services for an entire
geographic region8 9 An appropriate outcome measure should view
the provision of such care as a community benefit.90 .
Finally, the court's emphasis on donative support and on
whether the hospitals' revenues exceeded expenses 91 does not help
determine whether a hospital is organized in such a way that it can
respond to community needs, nor does it help to determine whether
the hospitals are achieving beneficial outcomes through the provision
of community benefits. The court's focus on donative support is incompatible with the operation of most modern hospitals that derive
most of their funds from third party payments. 92 Yet, this fact does
not limit their ability to benefit their communities.
The Utah Supreme Court itself subsequently retreated from its
strict donative support requirement. In Howell v. County Bd. of
Cache County,93 the court noted that the hospital in that case received
donations but found that the level of donations received was small

manner that allowed them to respond to community needs. See also notes 58, 62-65 and
accompanying text.
89. IntermountainHealth Care, 709 P.2d at 274 n.14.
90. See Colombo, 29 Wake Forest L. Rev. at 247 (cited in note 1) (stating that one measure
of community benefit should be the range of services provided by the non-profit health care
entity).
91. IntermountainHealth Care, 709 P.2d at 269.
92. The non-profit hospitals in Intermountain Health Care made a similar argument,
which the court rejected. Id. at 274.
93. 881 P.2d 880 (Utah 1994).

174

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49:161

compared to the hospital's overall revenue.9 4 The court was not
troubled by the fact that this hospital operated primarily from the
funds of paying patients, 95 and found that the hospital nonetheless
benefitted its community9 6 Apparently, the Utah Supreme Court has

recognized that this factor should not be determinative of which
entities provide community benefits.
The Utah court's focus on whether revenues exceeded expenses 97 is also not a valid outcome criteria. The real issue is whether
the excess revenues are used to improve the services that the nonprofit hospital provides to its community.98 If excess revenues are
used for this purpose, then the hospitals are still providing outcomes
that benefit their communities. There is evidence that non-profit
hospitals often use excess revenues to provide specialized services to
purchase high technology equipment that would not otherwise be
available to patients 99
The Utah Supreme Court's decision in Intermountain Health
Care remains a minority position.100 This fact does not, however,
reduce its significance. The decision embodies the continuing debate
over what functions a health care organization should perform to be
tax-exempt. Moreover, the same issues that troubled the Utah
Supreme Court with regard to non-profit hospitals are coming to the
94. Id. at 889 n.19.
95. Id: at 889.
96. Id.
97. IntermountainHealth Care, 709 P.2d at 269.
98. The IRS recognized this fact in Rev. Rul. 69-545, 1969-2 Cum. Bull. at 117 (cited in
note 3), where it stated that the fact that a hospital had excess revenues over expenses did not
preclude its exemption, so long as the revenues were used to improve the quality of facilities
and services provided by the entity.
99. See Seay and Sigmond, 5 Frontiers Health Services Mgmt. at 11 (cited in note 11).
100. See Texas Tax Code Ann. § 11.18(d)(1) (setting forth the requirements for qualification
as a charitable hospital). The Texas statute requires hospitals to meet one of six standards
regarding charitable care in order to be exempt from property tax. To be tax-exempt a hospital
must (1) provide a reasonable amount of charitable care, (2) provide 4% of net patient revenue
as charity care, (3) provide charity care equivalent to the hospital's tax-exempt benefits, (4) be a
disproportionate share hospital in one of the two previous years, (5) before 1996, provide 5% of
net patient revenue as charity care and community benefits with at least 3% of net patient
revenue being charity care, (6) after 1995, provide 5% of net patient revenue as charity care and
community benefits with at least 4% of net patient revenue being charity care. Id. Compare
Medical Center Hospital, 566 A.2d at 1355 (holding that a hospital should retain its tax-exempt
status, so long as it made its services available to all who needed them regardless of financial
standing); Callaway Community Hospital Association, 759 S.W.2d at 256 (holding that a
hospital that is operated in a not-for-profit manner, and whose services are made available to
both rich and poor persons, is charitable regardless of the number of indigent patients actually
served); Downtown Hospital Association, 760 S.W.2d at 957-58 (rejecting the Intermountain
Health Care test adopted by the Utah Supreme Court for determining the tax-exempt status of
non-profit hospitals and ruling instead that an organization that devotes its efforts to improving
the community is a charitable institution).
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forefront of the debate over the non-profit status of other health care
entities as the industry continues its trend toward managed care.
III.

THE EVOLUTION OF THE HEALTH CARE ORGANIZATIONAL MODEL

New models of health care delivery have developed in response
to rapid changes in the health care industry. 101 Although these entities do not resemble traditional hospitals, they have been treated
similarly for purposes of tax exemption because they perform essentially the same function of providing health care services.102
Furthermore, just as the tax-exempt status of hospitals has been
challenged at the state level, these new health care entities have
faced similar challenges at the federal level.
Many of the changes in the health care industry were brought
about by a novel approach to health care reform called managed competition. 1 3 This approach seeks to build on our private insurance
system by instituting several major changes. The basic goal of managed competition is to divide health care providers in each community
into competing economic entities, thereby utilizing the market to
encourage the efficient delivery of health care. 1 4
Various affiliations have developed between hospitals, doctors,
and insurance companies in response to the managed competition

101. See generally Hall, 29 Wake Forest L. Rev. at 1 (cited in note 6).
102. Michael W. Peregrine and Bernadette M. Broccolo, New IDS Determination Letters
Offer Promise, Sparks Controversy, 7 Exempt Org. Tax Rev. 757, 761 (May 1993).
103. This theory was first proposed by Stanford economist Alain C. Enthoven. For a
history of the evolution of this concept, see Alain C. Enthoven, The History and Principles of
Managed Competition, 1993 Health Affairs 25 (Supp. 1993) (tracing the development of the idea
of managed competition, describing the theory, and discussing it as a means to U.S. health care
reform). Enthoven envisioned a managed competition system in which individual subscribers
would choose from a variety of enrollment options among private insurance plans that would be
coordinated and monitored by a "sponsor." Id. at 30-35. In our traditional system, by contrast,
employers or the government have usually paid for the insurance and have offered only one
service option. Id. Requiring individuals to pay for the price of their insurance option in a
managed competition system makes individuals more cost conscious in their health care
decisions. Id. The managed competition system therefore relies on market forces rather than
regulatory forces to create efficiencies in the health care industry. Hall, 29 Wake Forest L. Rev.
at 4 (cited in note 6).
104. Enthoven, 1993 Health Affairs at 29 (cited in note 103). Consumers will also make
individual judgments concerning the cost and quality of their medical care and will bear the
economic consequences of these choices. Id. at 44. See also Hall, 29 Wake Forest L. Rev. at 2
(cited in note 6) (defining the goals of managed competition as universal health insurance
coverage along with cost containment and describing managed competition as a middle ground
between socialized medicine and our current market system of private insurance).
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concept.0 5 The reorganization of our health care system is currently
focused on so-called "integrated delivery systems. '' 106 Integrated delivery systems are organizations that provide all levels and types of
health care services through affiliated providers. They attempt to
achieve efficiency advantages by coordinating case management and
°
information flow among providers.1 7
Integrated delivery systems are unique from the organizational models that have previously dominated the health care industry.108 First, integrated delivery systems encompass a very broad
range of services; at a minimum they provide the full spectrum of
hospital and physician services, both inpatient and outpatient.109
They also provide long-term care facilities and many specialized services.11O
Another unique aspect of integrated delivery systems is the
incorporation of insurance risk into the delivery aspect of health
care."' This incorporation often occurs through a capitated payment
system." 2 Integrated delivery systems thus contrast sharply with
traditional health care models because the financial success of the
integrated delivery system depends on increasing the number of enrollees while economizing the cost of care."' With traditional models
of health care delivery, financial success hinges on the volume of
either the patients treated or the care provided." 4 The growth of
these new health care entities forces us to revisit many of the important issues faced by the hospital industry in determining how these
entities should be treated for tax purposes.

105. Hall, 29 Wake Forest L. Rev. at 4 (cited in note 6). Doctors, hospitals, and insurers
have quickly realized the necessity of forming "networks" in order to gain the benefits of the
managed care world. Id. at 4-5. No single physician or hospital can provide all of the services
that are required to participate in managed competition. Id.
106. Id. at 5.
107. Carl H. Hitchner, et al., Integrated Delivery Systems: A Survey Of Organizational
Models, 29 Wake Forest L. Rev. 273, 274 (1994).
108. Hall, 29 Wake Forest L. Rev. at 5 (cited in note 6).
109. Id.
110. Id.
111. Id. Another change that is expected to be brought about by the increasing prevalence
of integrated delivery systems is that physicians will eventually need to be affiliated with a
particular health plan or network. Id. at 4-5. Physicians have formerly had staff privileges at
many hospitals. Id. If managed competition is to be effective, both hospitals and physicians
must be aligned as independent economic entities. Id. at 4.
112. Id. at 5-6. Capitation is a method of payment in which the provider promises a full
spectrum of health care services for a fixed, per person fee. Id. at 6 n.10. This fee does not
depend on the volume of services received. Id. Under this payment method, the provider takes
on the function of an insurer. Id.
113. Id. at 6.
114. Id.
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There are numerous varieties of integrated delivery systems." 5
Because HMOs16 were one of the first attempts at health care
integration and have received a great deal of attention from the IRS,
this Note will examine the IRS's treatment of these organizations in
order to set forth the framework within which new forms of
integrated delivery systems are being evaluated.
A. Legal Frameworkfor the Tax Exemption of Managed CareEntities
Case law, IRS General Counsel Memoranda, and IRS determination letters have established the basic framework for analyzing the tax-exempt status of new health care entities, including integrated delivery systems." 7 The treatment of these new entities has
generally parallelled the precedents of hospital exemption.
The earliest decision addressing the tax-exempt status of an
HMO was the Tax Court's decision in Sound Health Association v.
Commissioner.18 Sound Health, a staff model HMO,"19 filed suit in
tax court after it was denied tax-exempt status by the IRS. 120 The
Association provided its own medical services through a staff of two
physicians at its own clinic and contracted with outside physicians for
2
other basic services.' '
The Tax Court applied the exemption standards set forth by
the IRS for hospitals in Revenue Ruling 69-545 and found that Sound
Health provided sufficient community benefits to justify its tax-exempt status. 22 The Tax Court held that while the HMO relied on a
membership system, its membership class was practically unlimited. 23 This was because the HMO planned to subsidize the dues of

115. See Hitchner, et al., 29 Wake Forest L. Rev. at 273 (cited in note 107) (surveying
various models of health care delivery systems).
116. HMOs issue contracts under which they agree to provide comprehensive health care
services for subscribers in exchange for set payments. Mark Hall and Ira Mark Ellman, Health
Care Law and Ethics 61 (West, 1990). The payments are capitated and thus not dependent on
the extent or type of services provided. Id. at 61-62.
117. IRS General Counsel Memoranda and determination letters are not legally binding
precedent. They do, however, articulate the IRS's position with respect to tax exemption issues.
118. 71 Tax Ct. 158 (1979).
119. Staff model HMOs employ their own physicians. They also typically own and operate
their own clinics and hospitals. Hitchner, et. al., 29 Wake Forest L. Rev. at 303 (cited in note
107).
120. Sound Health, 71 Tax Ct. at 159.
121. Id. at 168, 172.
122. Id. at 168-69, 181-84.
123. Id. at 185.
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those persons unable to pay. 124 The presence of the subsidized membership program demonstrated to the court that the HMO did in fact
125
benefit the community.
Furthermore, the HMO provided an emergency room open to
all persons regardless of membership with the HMO or ability to
pay. 126 The HMO also provided some free care to the poor, had an
open medical staff, provided health education programs for the community, and maintained an independent board of directors drawn
from the general community. 127 The IRS had not required hospitals to
treat all nonemergency persons regardless of ability to pay, and the
Tax Court held that an HMO should not be held to more stringent
requirements for tax exemption. 128 The court noted that the HMO
may have had an even stronger case for providing a public benefit
than the hospital in Revenue Ruling 69-545.129
Subsequent to the Sound Health decision, the IRS issued
General Counsel Memorandum 39,057,130 which denied tax-exempt
131
status to an independent practice association ("IPA") model HMO.
An IPA is made up of independant physicians -who maintain separate
practices but who contract with the IPA to provide services to an
HMO or other managed-care purchaser. 13 2 The IRS found that the
standards from Revenue Ruling 69-545 were also appropriate for an
IPA model HMO. 133 In contrast to Sound Health, however, the HMO
in question did not enroll individual members, did not have a plan to
enroll Medicare or Medicaid recipients, did not intend to implement a
subsidized dues program for either members or non-members, and did
not provide either emergency services or free care to the poor. 1' The
HMO also did not have an independent board of directors drawn from
that it operated primarthe general community. 135 The IRS concluded
136
physicians.
member
its
of
benefit
ily for the
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id. at 184.
127. Id. at 184-85, 187. The HMO also stated that approximately 34% of its patients served
in year one were expected to be Medicaid patients while approximately 2% were expected to be
charity patients. Id. at 171. The HMO anticipated that by the sixth year the figures would be
14% Medicaid and .7% charity care. Id.
128. Id. at 187-88.
129. Id. See notes 24-27 and accompanying text.
130. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,057 (Nov. 9, 1983).
131. Id.
132. Hitchner, et al, 29 Wake Forest L. Rev. at 275 n.4 (cited in note 107).
133. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,057 (cited in note 130).
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
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The IRS continued to delineate its position on the tax-exempt
status of HMOs with its issuance in 1990 of General Counsel
Memoranda 39,828 and 39,829.137 General Counsel Memorandum
39,828 set forth various factors that the IRS would assess in
considering whether an HMO was tax-exempt under Section 501(c)(3)
of the Internal Revenue Code.13 8 These factors generally mirrored the
requirements for hospitals with a few additional factors such as free
care to the indigent, a subsidized membership program, and research
and education programs.1 39 The IRS further required that no
meaningful restrictions be placed on the HMO's membership in order
to assure that the HMO would benefit the whole community and not
merely its members.140 Through its initial analysis of HMOs, the IRS
indicated that it would treat these entities as hospitals. The IRS's
position in the Geisinger litigation indicated, however, that it did not
view all HMOs as meriting this identical treatment. The Geisinger
litigation attempted to define what the community benefit test should
137. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,828 (Aug. 30, 1990); Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,829 (Aug. 30, 1990).
138. These factors included:
Actual provision of health care services and maintenance of facilities and staff; provision
of services to nonmembers on a fee-for-service basis; care and reduced rates for the indigent; care for those covered by medicare, medicaid or other similar assistance programs;
emergency room facilities available to the community without regard to their ability to
pay (and communication of this fact to the community); a meaningful subsidized membership program; a board of directors broadly representative of the community; health
education programs open to the community; health research programs; health care
providers who are paid on a fixed fee basis; and the application of any surplus to improving facilities, equipment, patient care, or to any of the above programs.
Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,828 at 14 (cited in note 137). See also Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,829 (setting
forth the factors required for an HMO to be tax-exempt under I.R.C. § 501(c)(4) as a social
welfare organization). The Service relied on a community benefit test which included: whether
membership was open to individuals and groups, whether the HMO serves the indigent, high
risk persons, medically underserved areas, or the elderly, and whether the HMO utilized a
community rating system for its premiums. Id. at 18-19.
139. Gen. Couns. Mem. 39,828 (cited in note 137).
140. Id. This requirement included provisions for individuals comprising a substantial
portion of the HMO's membership, a program to attract individual members, uniform rates for
prepaid care provided by a community rating system, similar rates charged to individuals and
groups, and no substantive age or health barriers for determining eligibility. Id.
General Counsel Memorandum 39,828 further complicated the issue of tax exemption for
HMOs by determining that an HMO was providing commercial insurance within the meaning of
I.R.C. § 501(m). Id. The IRS set forth relevant factors for determining whether an HMO
provides insurance within the meaning of I.R.C. § 501(m) in General Counsel Memorandum
39,829 (cited in note 137). These factors include: whether a transfer and distribution of an
insurance risk is taking place, whether the HMO operates similarly to commercial insurers or
Blue Cross/Blue Shield, whether the HMO markets a product similar to that of commercial
insurers, whether and to what extent the HMO provides health care services directly, and
whether the HMO has capitation or salary arrangements with providers that shift the risks of
loss. Id. at 41.

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49:161

require for HMOs in an attempt to distinguish clearly which
organizations are deserving of tax-exempt status.
B. The Geisinger Litigation: Redefining the Community Benefit Test
The Third Circuit's decision denying tax-exempt status to an
HMO in GeisingerHealth Plan v. Commissioner4l was an extremely
important decision for all types of health care providers. In Geisinger,
the Third Circuit attempted to redefine the community benefit test for
HMOs. 42 Geisinger Health Plan ("GHP"), an HMO, was part of a
system of eight other health care organizations in Pennsylvania, including two medical centers and one clinic. 43 All eight of the other
health care entities in the Geisinger system were tax-exempt.'" GHP
encompassed a predominantly rural service area that included many
medically underserved areas. 4 5 GHP was organized for charitable
purposes, had an independent board of directors, and had a membership open to both individual and group members. 148 GHP also enrolled Medicare subscribers. The organization planned eventually to
enroll Medicaid recipients and to offer a subsidized membership pro47
gram. 1
The IRS refused to grant GHP tax-exempt status.4 8 Affirming
the IRS's position on appeal, the Third Circuit agreed with the Sound
Health court that the standards for evaluating hospital tax exemption
were appropriate for HMOs.1 9 In analyzing the hospital precedents,
however, the Third Circuit determined that Revenue Ruling 69-545
did not eliminate the requirement that hospitals provide free care to
indigents. 50
The court next distinguished the Sound Health HMO from the
Geisinger HMO because GHP did not directly provide health care
services to its members through its own facilities, but instead contracted for their provision.' 51 The court also noted that the HMO in
Sound Health operated an open emergency room, provided some free

141. 985 F.2d 1210 (3rd Cir. 1993).
142. See id. at 1220 (stating that an HMO must 'primarily" benefit the community).
143. Id. at 1212.
144. Id.
145. Id. The court noted that 23% of GHP's enrollees resided in medically underserved
areas while an additional 65% resided in counties with medically underserved areas. Id.
146. Id. at 1213.
147. Id. at 1214.
148. Id.
149. Id. at 1216.
150. Id. at 1217.
151. Id. at 1217-18.
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care, and conducted research and educational programs. 152 The HMO
in Geisinger,however, did not operate an emergency room open to the
general public, was not a research facility, and did not provide educational programs for its community. 153 Although GHP intended to
subsidize membership for those unable to pay for its services, it had
been unable to generate the necessary funds at the time of the Third
opinion.54
Circuit's
IIn holding that GHP was not entitled to tax-exempt status,
the
Third Circuit found that GHP did not provide sufficient community
benefits, because it solely benefitted its subscribers. 55 The court
emphasized that in applying the community benefit standard, courts
should inquire whether a tax-exempt entity "primarily" benefits the
community, rather than simply whether it benefits the community at
all. 15 The court found that GHP's plan to subsidize members who
could not afford to join did not suffice to demonstrate that the HMO
"primarily" benefitted its community. 57 The court stated that the
community benefitted by GHP was limited to its own members, since
membership was a precondition to service.'58 Furthermore, the court
stated that GHP primarily benefitted itself by promoting membership
in its service area. 159 The court concluded that self-promotion, and not
a desire to benefit the community as a whole, was the reason that
GHP required an individual to be a member before receiving health
care services.

60

The Third Circuit also disagreed with the Sound Health court's
emphasis on the subsidized membership program as an indicia of
community benefit.' 6' The Third Circuit noted that the HMO in
Sound Health benefitted its community in many other ways, such as
by providing free care to non-subscribers and by offering educational
programs to the public. 62

152. Id. at 1218.
153. Id. at 1219.
154. Id. at 1213-14.

155. Id. at 1219-20. GHP did not provide its own health care services, did not conduct
educational or research programs, and did not maintain an open emergency room. Id.
156. Id.
157. Id. at 1219.
158. Id.
159. Id.
160. Id.
161. Id.
162. Id. at 1220.
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After finding that the GHP did not qualify for tax exemption
on its own, the Third Circuit remanded the case to the tax court to
determine whether GHP qualified for the exemption as an integral
part of the Geisinger system. 163 Under the integral part doctrine, one
organization may obtain tax exemption vicariously through related
organizations if the related organizations are involved in activities
that would qualify for tax exemption and if the activities advance the
exempt purposes of the related organizations.' 64 The Tax Court
nonetheless held that even under the integral part doctrine, GHP was
65
not exempt.'
66
On appeal, the Third Circuit affirmed on separate grounds.
The Third Circuit held that in order to obtain exemption under the
integral part doctrine, an entity must carry on a trade or business
that would be unrelated to the parent's primary trade or business if
engaged in by the parent organization. 167 Furthermore, the entity's
relationship to its parent must enhance its exempt character to the
extent that when this "boost" provided by the parent is added to the
contribution made by the subsidiary, the subsidiary would be entitled
to tax-exempt status on its own. 168 The court found that GHP's
relationship with the Geisinger system did not increase the number of
people served by GHP.169 Regardless of its association with its parent
organization, GHP would serve its own subscribers and thus did not
receive a sufficient "boost" to qualify for tax exemption under the
7°
integral part doctrine.'
The Third Circuit's decision in Geisinger represents an effort
by the courts and the IRS to determine what the community benefit
standard should require from non-profit health care entities. The
Third Circuit held that, as an initial matter, GHP must be organized
as a tax-exempt entity. 17' The court next attempted to refine the
community benefit standard in order to measure the socially desirable

163. Id.
164. Id.
165. Geisinger Health Plan v. Commissioner, 100 Tax Ct. 394, 406 (1993). The Tax Court
held that GHP would have produced unrelated business income if one of the Geisinger system's
exempt entities had absorbed its activities. Id. at 404-06. Therefore, GHP was not entitled to
tax exemption. Id. at 406.
166. Geisinger Health Plan v. Commissioner, 30 F.3d 494, 498 (3d Cir. 1994). The Third
Circuit did not deem it necessary to address the issue of unrelated business income. Id.
167. Id. at 501.
168. Id.
169. Id. at 502.
170. Id.
171. Geisinger,985 F.2d at 1214-15. GHP met this criteria because it was incorporated for
charitable purposes and prohibited private inurement. Id. at 1213-15.
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outcomes produced by HMOs.172 The court's new standard required
13
an HMO to demonstrate that it "primarily" benefits its community.'
The court also held that Revenue Ruling 69-545 did not eliminate the
requirement that non-profit health care organizations provide free
care. 74
The Geisingercourt sought to ensure that HMOs receiving taxexempt status were truly benefitting their communities and not
simply themselves. The court's standard, however, failed to measure
adequately the beneficial outcomes that HMOs can provide. First, the
court placed undue emphasis on the distinction between providing
health care services directly through a staff-model HMO and providing the same services through contractual relationships.'75 This is not
a valid basis for distinguishing between those types of health care
entities that provide socially desirable community benefits and those
that do not.176 The community benefits provided by a particular
health care entity are the same regardless of whether its physicians
are employees or independent contractors. There is simply no link
between the socially desirable outcomes that an entity provides and
its contractual relationships with its physicians.
Furthermore, the Third Circuit's test did not account for the
fact that GHP enrolled Medicare patients and was in negotiation for a
Medicaid contract. 7 7 The IRS had emphasized the non-discriminatory
treatment of Medicare and Medicaid patients as an element of community benefit in its evaluations of hospitals.'7 8 Such a requirement
furthers the socially desirable outcome of assuring that participants
in governmental reimbursement programs receive the same level of
The non-discriminatory
care as privately insured patients.'7 9
treatment of Medicare and Medicaid patients should thus constitute a
factor in meeting the outcome component of the community benefit
test for HMOs.

172. See id. at 1219-20 (analyzing whether the HMO "primarily" benefitted its community
such as by providing care to non-members).
173. Id. at 1220.
174. Id. at 1217.
175. Colombo, 29 Wake Forest L. Rev. at 245-46 (cited in note 1).
176. Id.
177. Geisinger, 985 F.2d at 1214.
178. 1969-2 Cum. Bull. at 117 (cited in note 3). See also notes 34-38 and accompanying
text.
179. See note 38 and accompanying text.
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The Third Circuit's test also focused on the amount of free care
provided by GHP.180 The court noted that GHP only planned to subsidize a small number of people in relation to its overall subscribership. 18' The Third Circuit's free care requirement resembles the one
imposed by the Utah Supreme Court in Intermountain Health Care,
and the same criticisms apply.182 If a determination of community
benefit is based on the amount of benefits, rather than on whether the
benefits provided actually meet community needs, then the health
care entity may not be achieving the most socially desirable out18 3

comes.

Even more problematic regarding appropriate outcome criteria
was the court's holding that subsidized membership is not an indicia
of community benefit.1M The court stated that only in rare circumstances would a health care organization be able to demonstrate that
a subsidized membership program was intended to benefit the community and not the entity itself. 8 5 This statement reflects the Third
Circuit's concern that HMOs might be able to obtain tax-exempt
status by maintaining only a superficial subsidized membership
program that did not truly benefit the community. The court's
standard, however, practically eliminates the ability of any health
care entity relying on a membership program to demonstrate that its
subsidized membership program provides community benefits. Even
if individuals must become members before they can receive health
care services, this should not negate the fact that they are receiving
measurable benefits from the HMO in the form of care that they
would not otherwise have received. This criticism was particularly
relevant in Geisingerbecause the HMO provided services to medically
underserved areas. 88 The court's standard should instead have
focused on whether the entity's membership program was adequately
serving the needs of its community.

180. Geisinger,985 F.2d at 1220.
181. GHP had not yet generated the funds to operate its subsidized membership program.

Id. at 1214. It argued, however, that this was because it had been unable to assure potential
donees of the deductibility of their contributions because it had not been granted tax-exempt
status. Id. The court assumed that GHP would eventually have operated its membership
program yet still found the necessary element of community benefit to be lacking. Id. at 1220.
182. See note 88 and accompanying text.
183. Id. The Third Circuit did note that GHP might not have had to operate an open
emergency room under Rev. Rul. 83-157 if this service was unneccessary or duplicative.
Geisinger, 985 F.2d at 1219. However, the court stated that despite this argument, GHP did not
primarily benefit its community. Id.
184. Id.
185. Id.
186. Id. at 1212.
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The community benefit standard promulgated by the Third
Circuit in Geisinger demonstrates that the courts and the IRS have
taken a narrow view of community benefit with regard to HMOs.
Neither the IRS nor the Third Circuit, however, has adequately refined the community benefit test by providing outcome criteria that
measure the benefits that HMOs often provide to their communities.
Against the backdrop of IRS precedents regarding hospitals and
HMOs, integrated delivery systems developed. The IRS had to adopt
a new framework to fit these innovative health care entities.
C. IntegratedDelivery Systems and What the IRS Wants From Them
The IRS, through determination letters, has granted tax-exempt status to seven integrated delivery systems in the last two
years. 187 While these rulings are not legally binding, they demonstrate the IRS's basic requirements for the tax exemption of integrated delivery systems. 18 8 In granting integrated delivery systems
tax-exempt status, the IRS has focused on several factors that closely
resemble the requirements for hospitals. The IRS has considered
whether the integrated delivery system operates open emergency
rooms, maintains open medical staffs, participates in Medicare and
Medicaid, and conducts research and education programs. 8 9 In addition, the IRS has considered several other factors unique to integrated
delivery systems. For example, the IRS has viewed favorably integrated delivery systems that have a twenty percent physician representation limitation for their boards of directors because this minimizes the potential for private inurement of the exempt organization's

187. Full-Text Exemption Ruling- Friendly Hills HealthCare Network (January 29, 1993)
in 7 Exempt Org. Tax Rev. 490 (1993); Full-Text Exemption Ruling: Facey Medical Foundation
(March 31, 1993) in 7 Exempt Org. Tax Rev. 828 (1993); Full-Text Exemption Ruling: DMC
Centers, Inc. (December 8, 1993); Full-Text Exemption Ruling: Billings Clinic (December 21,
1993); Full-Text Exemption Ruling: Harriman Jones Medical Foundation (February 3, 1994) in
9 Exempt Org. Tax Rev. 719 (i994); Full-Text Exemption Ruling: Rockford Memorial Health
Services Corporation (April 4, 1994); Full-Text Exemption Ruling. St. Luke's Medical
Associates, Inc. (December 30, 1994) in 11 Exempt Org. Tax Rev. 490 (1995).
188. Determination letters are not official IRS precedent. Peregrine and Broccolo, 7
Exempt Org. Tax Rev. at 797 (cited in note 102). Yet, they are extremely helpful in delineating
the IRS's position on what types of health care organizations can be tax-exempt. Id.
189. Friendly Hills, 7 Exempt Org. Tax Rev. at 491 (cited in note 187); Facey, 7 Exempt
Org. Tax Rev. at 829-30 (cited in note 187); Harriman Jones, 9 Exempt Org. Tax Rev. at 720
(cited in note 187).
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funds. 190 Likewise, the IRS has viewed favorably the extensive recordkeeping advantages of integrated delivery systems, which are
achieved through these organizations' ability to integrate patient
records and avoid duplicate testing and procedures.19' Finally, the
IRS has focused on whether an integrated delivery system has made a
commitment to charitable care, either through a policy of admitting
emergency indigent patients or through a specific dollar commitment
192
to charitable care.
One determination letter demonstrates that the IRS may have
changed its position regarding the necessity of providing health care
services directly rather than through contractual relationships. In
Geisinger, the IRS contended that one reason why the HMO was not
providing a community benefit was that it did not provide health care
services itself but merely contracted for them. 93 However, the IRS
granted tax-exempt status to the Facey Medical Foundation even
though it did not own or operate an acute care hospital1 94 Instead,
the Foundation was responsible for organizing and facilitating health
It also contracted with
care services through other entities.195
directly employing
than
rather
services
physicians to provide

physicians. 196
IV. THE FUTURE OF TAX EXEMPTION IN THE HEALTH CARE INDUSTRY

The health care industry has encountered attacks on non-profit
status from several fronts. State governments have increasingly

190. Friendly Hills, 7 Exempt Org. Tax Rev. at 491 (cited in note 187); Facey, 7 Exempt
Org. Tax Rev. at 829-30 (cited in note 187); Harriman Jones, 9 Exempt Org. Tax Rev. at 720
(cited in note 187).
191. Friendly Hills, 7 Exempt Org. Tax Rev. at 491 (cited in note 187); Facey, 7 Exempt
Org. Tax Rev. at 829-30 (cited in note 187); Harriman Jones, 9 Exempt Org. Tax Rev. at 720
(cited in note 187).
192. The Friendly Hills and Facey determination letters are representative of this fact.
The Friendly Hills integrated delivery system was committed to admitting emergency indigent
patients for free or discounted follow-up care. Friendly Hills, 7 Exempt Org. Tax Rev. at 491
(cited in note 187). The Facey integrated delivery system promised to provide $400,000 of
charitable care during its first two years of operation and corresponding amounts in future
years. Facey, 7 Exempt Org. Tax Rev. at 830 (cited in note 187). The Harriman Jones
integrated delivery system similarly promised to provide $750,000 of charitable care in its first
two years of operation. Harriman Jones, 9 Exempt Org. Tax Rev. at 795 (cited in note 187).
The Billings Clinic promised to treat all patients regardless of ability to pay and further planned
to implement charitable care programs to reach the elderly and children in its community. Id.
193. Geisinger,985 F.2d at 1219.
194. Facey, 7 Exempt Org. Tax Rev. at 829 (cited in note 187).
195. Id.
196. Id.
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looked toward the health care industry for new sources of revenue. 197
At the federal level, Geisinger reexamined tax-exemption standards
for HMOs. 19 The IRS has also delineated new standards for the tax
exemption of integrated delivery systems. 99 When viewed against the
backdrop of the hospital tax-exemption cases and the Geisinger case,
it is possible to analyze the IRS's requirements for integrated delivery
systems to determine whether they adequately refine the community
benefit test.
A. Tax Exemption and IntegratedDelivery Systems
The IRS determination letters, along with the Geisinger case,
have clarified the IRS's position on the tax exemption of integrated
delivery systems. All of the integrated delivery systems that have
been granted tax-exempt status by the IRS have provided community
benefits beyond what was required of hospitals in Revenue Ruling 69545.200 In addition to the benefits traditionally provided by hospitals,201 integrated delivery systems have offered efficiency and recordkeeping advantages, research and education programs, and specific
202
goals for charitable care.
Just as the IRS is struggling to redefine the tax-exempt status
of hospitals and HMOs, the IRS is seeking to refine the community
benefit test to fit integrated delivery systems. The IRS's criteria for
integrated delivery systems have included both organizational and
outcome based components. Nonetheless, the IRS has failed to refine
adequately the community benefit test.
The requirement that an integrated delivery system limit physician representation on its board of directors to twenty percent is an
organizational criteria. The new twenty percent restriction constitutes an effort on the part of the IRS to ensure that integrated delivery systems maintain their community focus and do not engage in
197. See Seay and Sigmond, 5 Frontiers Health Services Mgmt. at 3-4 (cited in note 11)
(noting that non-profit hospitals are attractive revenue sources with their large property
holdings and cash flows). See also notes 8, 100 and accompanying text.
198. See Part III.B.
199. See Part III.C.
200. See notes 190-92 and accompanying text.
201. In determining the tax-exempt status of an integrated delivery system, the IRS has
considered whether the integrated delivery system operates an open emergency room, treats
Medicare and Medicaid patients, maintains an open medical staff, and limits physician
membership on its board of directors to 20%. See, for example, Friendly Hills, 7 Exempt Org.
Tax Rev. at 491 (cited in note 187).
202. See notes 191-92 and accompanying text.
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private inurement, 203 goals consistent with the underlying rationale of
the community benefit test. However, the IRS need not have established a rigid limitation on physician representation to achieve
this goal. Under the original community benefit standard, the IRS
required that the board of directors be composed of members of the
community but did not specify a maximum percentage of physician
representation.24 This requirement of an independent board of directors drawn from the general community served the same function as
the IRS's twenty percent limitation on physician representation. 20 5
Yet, it also had the benefit of greater flexibility, thus allowing health
care systems an opportunity to involve physicians in their governance.
By imposing a twenty percent physician limitation on its board of
directors, the IRS may have discounted the contribution physicians
can make in determining and responding to the needs of their
20 6
communities .
The open medical staff requirement is an organizational crite20 7
the IRS has carried over from its treatment of hospitals.
that
rion
This requirement ensures that physicians have broad access privileges to health care organizations so that patients can benefit from
their services.2 08 The requirement is thus consistent with the rationale that non-profit health care entities should be organized in a manner that allows them to be responsive to the needs of their communities. If the trends toward managed care continue, however, this criterion may no longer be appropriate. 20 9 The managed care concept is
premised on competition.210 It requires that distinct economic entities
compete for patients.211 In order to compete effectively, these entities
must align themselves with physicians so that they can offer their
patients a select group of doctors.212 If competition in health care is a
community benefit, then an open medical staff may not be necessary
203. Colombo, 29 Wake Forest L. Rev. at 241-42 (cited in note 1).
204. 1969-2 Cum. Bull. at 117 (cited in note 3).
205. See J. David Seay and Bruce C. Vladeck, Mission Matters, in J. David Seay and Bruce
C. Vladeck, eds., In Sickness and In Health, The Mission of Voluntary Health Care Institutions
1, 13 (McGraw-Hill, 1988) (stating that the independent board of directors requirement ensures
that non-profits maintain their community focus). The potential problem with the IRS's new
requirement is that if the health care industry continues its trend toward managed care,
physicians will need to be included and not alienated from leadership roles during this
transition period. Colombo, 29 Wake Forest L. Rev. at 216 (cited in note 1).
206. Colombo, 29 Wake Forest L. Rev. at 216 (cited in note 1).
207. 1969-2 Cum. Bull. at 117 (cited in note 3).
208. Peregrine and Broccolo, 7 Exempt Org. Tax Rev. at 792 (cited in note 102).
209. Colombo, 29 Wake Forest L. Rev. at 216-17 (cited in note 1).
210. Id.
211. Id.
212. Id.
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to ensure that health care entities are responsive to their
communities.
In terms of outcome-based criteria, on the other hand, the IRS
has focused first on the open emergency room requirement, which the
IRS carried over from its treatment of hospitals. 213 This requirement
ensures that integrated delivery systems serve as a safety net for
those without health insurance,2' 4 a function consistent with the underlying rationales of the community benefit test.215 The second outcome based criteria requires the nondiscriminatory treatment of
Medicare and Medicaid patients, which was also required of hospitals.216 This requirement is also consistent with the underlying rationale of the community benefit standard because it ensures that
217
Medicare and Medicaid patients receive quality care.
The IRS has developed a new outcome criteria for integrated
delivery systems based upon the efficiency advantages of health care
integration. 2' 8 If the integrated delivery systems create such efficiency advantages through the integration of medical and recordkeeping functions or through the avoidance of duplicate tests and
procedures, then encouraging such efficiency is certainly consistent
with the underlying rationale for the community benefit standard.
Efficiency advantages are a socially desirable benefit because they
result in lower costs, making medical services available to a broader
segment of the community. The IRS has also focused on medical
research and public education as outcome criteria. 21 9 Since these
considerations provide community benefits that the government
might otherwise have to provide, they are also appropriate outcome
220
criteria.
Finally, charitable care has become an extremely important
221
outcome criteria for determining which entities will be tax-exempt.
The requirement of charitable care certainly satisfies one of the traditional rationales of the community benefit standard in that it ensures
that integrated delivery systems provide health care to members of

213. 1969-2 Cum. Bull. at 117 (cited in note 3).
214. Colombo, 29 Wake Forest L. Rev. at 217 (cited in note 1).
215. See note 38 and accompanying text.

216. 1969-2 Cum. Bull. at 117 (cited in note 3).
217.
218.
219.
220.
221.

See note 37 and accompanying text.
See, for example, Friendly Hills, 7 Exempt Org. Tax Rev. at 491 (cited in note 187).
Id.
See note 11 and accompanying text.
See notes 72, 150, 180-83 and accompanying text.

190

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 49:161

the community who could not otherwise afford it.222 The problem with

this requirement is that the IRS and the Third Circuit in Geisinger
have taken a narrow view of what charitable care is. The IRS and the
Third Circuit agreed in Geisinger that subsidized membership programs do not provide community benefits.223 However, a managed
care organization with a subsidized membership program is providing
charitable care even when the persons benefitting from the services
are required to become members. The fact that an indigent person
becomes a member of such an organization neither reduces the health
care benefits that such a person receives nor converts the community
benefit into a private benefit enjoyed by the health care organization.
Furthermore, the IRS determination letters indicate that the
Service looks favorably on institutions that specify a precise amount
of charitable care that will be given away.224 This conception of the

charitable care requirement far exceeds what has been required of
hospitals since Revenue Ruling 69-545.225 While this requirement
may further the extent to which a health care entity provides socially
desirable benefits to its community, it will not necessarily do So. 22 6
The IRS should instead provide incentives for hospitals and
integrated delivery systems to offer the types of health care services
that are most needed. 2 7 Such services might include preventive care
such as immunizations, physicals, prenatal care, high blood pressure
testing, and diabetic monitoring.228 By providing incentives for
integrated delivery systems to deliver the most needed services, the
IRS would truly be furthering the community benefit standard's goal
of providing outcomes that are socially desirable and that the
government might otherwise have to provide.
The Geisinger case and the Facey Foundation determination
letter leave one further issue unresolved. Namely, the extent to
which an organization's integration affects its tax-exempt status. In
denying tax-exempt status to an HMO, the Geisingercourt focused on
the fact that the Geisinger Health Plan did not provide any medical

222. See note 11 and accompanying text.
223. Geisinger, 985 F.2d at 1219. The court left open the possibility that in some circumstances an HMO might be able to demonstrate that a membership program was intended to
benefit the community and not merely to promote subscribership. Id.
224. See, for example, Facey, 7 Exempt Org. Tax Rev. at 829 (cited in note 187) (promising
to give away at least $400,000 in charitable care every two years). See also note 192 and
accompanying text.
225. See notes 24-27 and accompanying text.
226. See note 88 and accompanying text.
227. See notes 88, 183 and accompanying text.
228. See note 88 and accompanying text.
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services itself but rather contracted for them.229 On the other hand,
the IRS granted the Facey Foundation an exemption even though it
only facilitated health care delivery without directly providing health
care services. 230 The reasoning in the Facey Foundation letter ruling
should prevail because denying an entity tax-exempt status based on
its integration cannot be justified on either organizational or outcomebased rationales. Entities that solely facilitate the provision of
medical services can be organized and governed in a manner that is
just as responsive to community needs as entities that directly provide the same services. 23 1 Furthermore, there is no tangible distinction between the community benefits produced by an organization
that provides medical services itself and one that contracts for the
provision of such services. Hopefully, the IRS has recognized the
superficial nature of such a consideration in determining whether an
entity meets the community benefit standard.
B. The Search for a Rationalefor Exempting Health Care
OrganizationsFrom Taxation
The debate over the tax exemption of hospitals and other
health care entities illustrates the deep ideological underpinnings of
current health care debates. The Utah Supreme Court, the Third
Circuit, and the IRS have all attempted to refine the community benefit test to distinguish between the types of health care entities that
deserve tax exemption and those that do not.
As this Note has demonstrated, the community benefit standard is supported by a dual rationale. Health care organizations
should be exempt from taxation if they are organized in a manner
that allows them to be responsive and accountable to community
needs 232 and if they provide socially desirable community benefits to
their communities that the government might otherwise have to pro-

229. Geisinger, 985 F.2d at 1219-20.
230. Facey, 7 Exempt Org. Tax Rev. at 828-29 (cited in note 187).
231. See notes 175-76 and accompanying text.
232. See Seay, 7 Exempt Org. Tax Rev. at 417 (cited in note 10) (stating that non-profit
institutions are unique because of their governance and management processes). See also Seay
and Vladeck, Mission Matters, in Seay and Vladeck, eds., In Sickness and In Health at 26-27
(cited in note 205) (stating that non-profit health care organizations should make continual
efforts to reassess their commitment to the community and to address the community's health
care needs).
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These qualities distinguish non-profit health care entities

2 34
from their for-profit counterparts.
The IRS and the courts must recognize the dual rationales
supporting the community benefit standard and refine the test so that
it is explicitly premised on both organizational and outcome criteria.
As this Note has discussed, the IRS has already recognized the need
to ensure that health care entities are organized in such a way as to
be responsive to their communities. 2 5 This is evidenced by the IRS's
emphasis on an independant board of directors for hospitals, a twenty
percent limitation on physician representation on an integrated delivery system's board of directors, open medical staffs, and prohibitions
against private inurement.
However, the IRS has failed to state explicitly that the function of these requirements is to ensure that non-profits are organized
in such a way as to be responsive to community needs. In implementing explicit organizational criteria, the IRS should not necessarily
impose narrow, exclusive requirements on non-profit health care
organizations. The organizational criteria should be broad enough to
allow non-profit health care organizations to satisfy the standard in
various ways. As this Note has previously discussed, strictly limiting
physician representation on an integrated delivery system's board of
directors may not further the underlying goal that non-profit health
care entities be organized in a manner that allows them to be responsive to community needs. 236 The IRS should not rule out the
possibility that non-profit health care entities could create unique

237
ways of meeting the organizational criteria.

The community benefit standard must also measure outcomes,
the socially desirable benefits produced by non-profit entities that
relieve the government's burden of providing health care services.
The IRS should also make this outcome criteria an explicit prong of
the community benefit test. This Note has previously discussed the
failure of both the IRS and the courts to develop outcome criteria that
adequately measure the community benefits provided by non-profit

233. See notes 10-11 and accompanying text.
234. See Seay and Vladeck, Mission Matters, in Seay and Vladeck, eds., In Sickness and In
Health at 9 (cited in note 205) (stating that these institutions have also symbolized an American
tradition of limited governmental involvement in local affairs). See also note 10-11 and
accompanying text.
235. See note 10.
236. See notes 204-206 and accompanying text.
237. For example, if an integrated delivery system has a committee composed of community members that attempts to develop plans for the provision of charitable care, the IRS's
organizational criteria should take this into account.
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health care entities. 238 Consequently, the IRS and the courts have not
developed outcome criteria that measure the benefits that non-profit
health care entities provide through service to medically underserved
areas or to a subsidized membership.239 Furthermore, the IRS and the
courts have focused on the specific amount of charitable care provided
by a health care organization in assessing whether the entity benefits
its community, rather than on the type of care provided and its value
240
to the community.
The IRS and the courts have also ignored the benefits derived
from the provision of medical services to medically underserved areas.
For example, in Geisinger,twenty-three percent of the members of the
Geisinger Health Plan lived in medically underserved areas while
another sixty-five percent lived in counties with medically underserved areas. 241 The Intermountain Health Care case provides
another example.242 One of the non-profit hospitals in that case was
243
the sole provider of specialized hospital services for its entire region.
Because rural areas often do not receive modern health care benefits,
service to such areas constitutes a socially desirable benefit that the
government might otherwise have to provide.2 44 In failing to view
service to underserved areas as a community benefit, the IRS has
failed to utilize tax policy effectively to encourage the efficient delivery of health care services to a broad segment of the population.245
Granting a tax exemption based on service to medically underserved
areas would encourage health care providers to move into these areas
246
by providing a carrot of favorable tax treatment.
Subsidized membership in a health care organization should
also satisfy the outcome component of the community benefit standard. The IRS and the Third Circuit in Geisinger, however, failed to
account for the socially desirable benefits that such membership
programs can provide. 247 As this Note has previously discussed, if an

238. See notes 88-92, 97-99, 175-86 and accompanying text.
239. See notes 89-90, 177-86 and accompanying text. See also Colombo, 29 Wake Forest L.
Rev. at 219 (cited in note 1) (stating that outpatient service to medically underserved areas
should be a component of community benefit).
240. See note 88 and accompanying text.
241. Geisinger,985 F.2d at 1212.
242. IntermountainHealth Care, 709 P.2d 265.
243. Id. at 274 n.14.
244. Colombo, 29 Wake Forest L. Rev. at 246 (cited in note 1).
245. Id. at 246-47.
246. Id. at 247.
247. Geisinger, 985 F.2d at 1219. See also notes 184-86 and accompanying text.
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HMO or other form of integrated delivery system has a subsidized
membership program that meaningfully attempts to meet the health
care needs of the indigent members of its community, such an entity
8
provides a measurable community benefit.24
Finally, the outcome component of the community benefit test
should not focus solely on the amount of charitable care that an entity
provides. As this Note has previously discussed, such a criterion
bears no logical relationship to the needs of a particular community.249
Focusing on the dollar amount of charitable care provided allows
health care organizations to seek out only medically interesting
charity cases instead of providing services such as preventive care for
which there is a greater need.250 The outcome component of the community benefit standard should look to whether a health care organization is responding to the needs of its particular community instead
of whether the entity is meeting some arbitrary level of charitable
care. 251 The outcome criteria should thus encourage health care organizations to provide services that are most needed in their particular communities. If preventive care such as physicals, immunizations, prenatal care, or blood pressure testing will provide the greatest benefits to a particular community, then the outcome criteria of
the community benefit standard should encourage this result.252
The community benefit standard must be explicitly based on
both organizational and outcome criteria. The organizational prong
will ensure that non-profit health care organizations structure
themselves so as to remain accountable and responsive to community
needs. The outcome prong will ensure that these organizations actually provide socially desirable community benefits that the government might otherwise have to provide. As this Note has discussed,
the organizational and outcome criteria must not be so narrow, however, that they fail to account for the benefits provided by non-profit
entities.

248. See notes 183-86 and accompanying text.
249. See note 88 and accompanying text.
250. See Elizabeth M. Guggenheimer, Making The Case For Voluntary Health Care
Institutions: Policy Theories And Legal Approaches, in Seay and Vladeck, eds., In Sickness and
In Health 35, 62-63 (cited in note 205) (stating that tax-exempt health care entities should offer
services important to their communities and should not focus on profitability).
251. Id.
252. See id. at 59 (stating that non-profit health care institutions should be encouraged to
provide community benefits in a variety of ways).
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195

V. CONCLUSION

At the present time, tax exemption has an uncertain future in
the health care industry. Many states have attempted to revoke this
benefit in order to tap into hospitals and other health care organizations as badly needed sources of revenue. Meanwhile, the Geisinger
decision and the IRS's application of the community benefit standard
have made it increasingly difficult for health care organizations to
maintain tax-exempt status.
There is a valid basis for distinguishing between the types of
entities that merit tax exemption and those that do not. That basis is
a properly defined community benefit standard. A properly defined
standard must focus on both the organizational structure and beneficial outcomes produced by non-profit health care organizations. The
principal benefits of the non-profit structure will be eliminated if the
courts and the IRS continue to narrow the definition of "community
benefit" so as to preclude more efficient and innovative organizational
structures within the health care industry. Implementation of a well
defined community benefit standard, which explicitly focuses on both
organization and outcomes, would help to align our tax policy with the
overall goals of our health care system.
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